Corporate Divestitures and Spinoffs in Singapore by KOH, Francis et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
3-2005 
Corporate Divestitures and Spinoffs in Singapore 
Francis KOH 
Singapore Management University, franciskoh@smu.edu.sg 
Winston T. H. KOH 
Singapore Management University, winstonthkoh@gmail.com 
Benedict S. K. KOH 
Singapore Management University, skkoh@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Portfolio 
and Security Analysis Commons 
Citation 
KOH, Francis; KOH, Winston T. H.; and KOH, Benedict S. K.. Corporate Divestitures and Spinoffs in 
Singapore. (2005). Journal of Restructuring Finance. 2, (1), 69-79. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian 
School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2606 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
Corporate Divestitures and Spinoffs in 
Singapore*   
 
 
Francis C.C. Koha, Winston T.H. Koh b, Benedict S.K. Kohc   
 
30 June 2004 
  
Abstract 
This paper discusses the different forms of corporate divestitures, the 
motives for this corporate activity and the empirical findings about their 
economic outcomes. A sample of corporate divestitures is also used to 
identify the main motivations in the Singapore context. We conclude 
that divestitures are carried out to achieve operational efficiency, gain 
incremental profitability and liquidity. Using share price data around the 
event-dates, we show that announcements of divestitures generally lead 
to significant increases in the returns of the parent company. The  
positive abnormal returns are related to the relative size of the 
divestitures and the computed accounting gains. Overall, corporate 
divestiture is a value-increasing activity for Singapore companies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘divestiture’ covers a number of corporate actions.  As Rosenfeld 
(1984) puts it, divestiture involves ‘an alteration of the firm’s productive asset 
portfolio, and is accomplished by either spinning-off or selling off the unwanted 
assets.’  Corporate restructuring, via voluntary divestments and spinoffs, has become 
a commonly-used strategy since the 1980s.  Over the past two decades, a substantial 
number of firms worldwide have disposed of many peripheral activities to 
concentrate on their core businesses.   
The increasing number and size of spinoffs, sell-offs, equity carved-outs and 
partial private sales have brought about significant changes to the way businesses are 
being conducted.  Formally, a spinoff occurs when a company distributes all the 
shares it owns in a controlled subsidiary to its existing shareholders, thereby creating 
a separate publicly listed company.  A sell-off occurs when a part or all of the 
company’s assets are sold to another party in return for cash or securities.  In the case 
where a portion of a subsidiary is offered for sale to the public, this is referred to as 
‘split-off initial public offering,’ or more commonly known as equity carved-out. 
Many empirical studies have recorded that there are gains to the parent 
company in corporate divestitures. We provide a brief review of the empirical studies 
in the literature in Section 2, while Section 3 reviews the motives for divestitures. In 
Section 4, we frame the hypotheses linking the announcement effects of corporate 
divestitures to share price performance.  We also describe the sample and testing 
methodology used in Section 5.  The results are reported in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes with a discussion of directions for future research.   
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2. Review of Previous Studies 
Corporate divestiture was a worldwide phenomenon throughout the 1990s.  In 
the United States, a study by Vijh (1994) reported that there has been a large increase 
in the number of corporate restructuring programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Gilson reports that, “Since 1980, more than 2,000 public companies, with nearly 
US$700 billion of assets, have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.” And, 
“during this period, more than 1,500 companies have split themselves apart through 
equity spin-offs and care-outs, or by issuing tracking stocks, creating over US$700 
billion in new publicly traded equity.”  
Mergers and acquisitions do not always succeed. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) 
document that in a sample of 282 corporate acquisitions, which occurred between 
1971 and 1987, 44% were divested by 1989. These de-mergers add to the pool of 
divestitures. 
There have been a number of important studies examining the outcomes of 
corporate divestitures and spinoffs.  In the early eighties, the early wave of corporate 
restructuring prompted studies by Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfield 
(1983) on spin-offs, Rosenfeld (1984) and Jain (1985) on sell-offs, and Schipper and 
Smith (1986) on equity carved-outs.  
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) study 55 spin-offs and find significantly large 
positive abnormal returns over the announcement period. Similar research by Hite 
and Owers (1983) also record significant increases in share prices around spin-off 
announcements. Both results suggest that announcements of spin-offs generally 
improve shareholder wealth. The studies also conclude that larger spin-offs tend to 
exhibit stronger price movements than those which are relatively smaller.  
 4
In his research on a sample of 62 cases of sell-offs, Rosenfeld (1984) detects 
significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates. This finding is 
further supported by Jain (1985). Jain analyzes a sample of more than one thousand 
sell-offs. He reports positive abnormal returns for a 5-day period preceding the 
announcement date. These results indicate that sell-off announcements are also 
beneficial to shareholders, though their effects are notably smaller than those of spin-
offs.  
The research on equity carved-outs was conducted by Schipper and Smith 
(1986). Using a sample of 76 carved-outs, Schipper and Smith show that firms with 
equity carved-outs experience strong positive abnormal returns for a 5-day period 
preceding and including the event date. Their results indicate that announcements of 
equity carved-outs are also value-enhancing events.  
Empirical research in the 1990s show that firms continued to earn positive 
excess returns when they announce spin-offs and corporate divestitures.  Kaplan and 
Weisbach (1992) conclude that although there are a high proportion of acquisitions 
that are subsequently divested, this is not the result of corporate “failures”. A high 
percentage of the divestitures are carried out by acquirers which reported a “gain” or 
“no loss” on divestment, that is, most firms are sold for more than their cost. 
Furthermore, in those observations where the acquiring and target firms are not 
related, almost 60 per cent are subsequently divested in contrast to 20 per cent for 
related acquisitions. This implies that unrelated acquisitions have a higher probability 
of a subsequent divestiture.  
Vijh (1994) reports that excess returns of 3 per cent are obtained on the spin-
off ex-dates. Vijh attributes this to a “clientele” effect, where the parent and 
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subsidiary stocks attract different investors who prefer to buy the separated shares 
after the ex-date. This is another finding supporting the conclusion that spin-offs are 
wealth-increasing events.  
Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) study the value creation of spinoffs over 
the period 1965 to 1988, by measuring the stock returns of spinoffs, the parent firms 
and the parent-spinoff combinations for periods of up to three years following the 
spinoffs. The authors find significantly positive abnormal returns for all three sets of 
entities.  Habib, Johnsen and Naik (1997) provide an information-based explanation 
for spinoffs.  They argue that when the various divisions of a firm are spun off into 
several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities 
increases.  As a result, the price system becomes more informative, and the quality of 
investment decisions made by managers improves.  At the same time, the uncertainty 
about the value of the divisions is lowered.  Both of these effects serve to increase the 
sum total of the market values of the spun-off divisions above the market value of the 
original firm.  
Similarly, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that information 
symmetries in parent firms are positively related to the excess stock returns around 
spin-off announcements, while Daley Mehrontra and Sivakuma (1997) report that 
focus-increasing spinoffs in the United States earn higher excess stock returns during 
the announcement period relative to spin-offs that do not increase the corporate focus.   
Along a similar vein, Huson and MacKinnon (2003) examine the effect of 
corporate spinoffs on the trading environment of the stock of firms that spin off units.  
The authors find that changes in the information environment associated with 
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focusing spinoffs appear to benefit informed traders at the expense of uninformed 
traders.   
Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2004) have provided a summary of a number 
of empirical studies relating to divestitures. This is reproduced in Table 1. From the 
table, it can be seen that the return to the parent company, around the announcement 
date, is in the range of 1 to 4 per cent over a narrow window of between one to 4 
days. This is a significant result. The positive return to the parent company indicates 
that divestitures are a wealth-increasing event for the parent company.  
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Outside of the United States, relatively little academic research on corporate 
divestments has been carried out.  In two papers, Haynes, Thompson and Wright 
(2000, 2003) examine the extent and the determinants of divestment across a sample 
of 141 firms in the United Kingdom over the period 1985-1989.  The studies 
conclude that corporate divestment activities are purposeful responses to exogenous 
change in a manner broadly consistent with both the agency-theoretic and strategic 
views of the firm.  
Thus, the literature provides evidence that, on the whole, divestitures have wealth-
enhancing effects and they have been carried out with purpose.  In the next section, 
we examine the motivations behind corporate restructuring, through spinoffs and 
divestments, and with reference to the case of Singapore companies.   
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3.  Motives for Divestitures 
 
In a world of zero information cost and transaction costs, divestitures would 
be irrelevant as a firm cannot increase its value by restructuring itself. But, in a less 
than perfect world, restructuring may confer benefits to either the parent or its 
subsidiary.  
For example, an equity carved-out may create a new public entity which can 
pursue independent growth strategies separate from the parent firm without impinging 
on the reputation of the latter. The new entity may also raise capital for the parent and 
increase its financial resources.  
Similarly, a spin-off may provide information to existing shareholders of the 
intent of the parent company to “focus” or “re-focus”. Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) argue that firms that are more focused (that is, carry out 
business in fewer industries) are more valued than less focused firms, ceteris paribus. 
Gilson (2001) explains that managers of focused firms are less distracted and better 
able to oversee the firm’s core business operations.  
Allen (2001) notes that the sources of the gains in spin-offs are difficult to 
identify and validate. According to him, spin-offs may offer the following benefits: 
(a) mitigate an unwieldy organizational structure by increasing focus 
(b) enhance contracting efficiency 
(c) reduce regulatory or tax constraints 
(d) reduce information asymmetries regarding the operations of the parent 
firms 
 
(e) correct past acquisition mistakes, and 
(f) improve managers’ incentives to maximize shareholder wealth in 
spun-off firms. 
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In the Asia-Pacific region, corporate restructuring increased significantly in 
the 1990s.  This gathered momentum after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. The 
growing number and size of spin-offs, sell-offs, equity carved-outs and partial private 
sales may be attributed to both the maturity of the capital markets in the Asia Pacific 
region and the increased opportunities for restructuring resulting from the economic 
downturn and subsequent recovery.  
Similarly, Singapore has experienced an increase in the number of corporate 
divestitures in Singapore since early 1990s.  This may be attributed, firstly, to the 
growth of merger and acquisition activities since the 1980s, in tandem with the 
development of the capital markets in Singapore.  Secondly, with a larger pool of 
listed and unlisted companies, the general sophistication of the financial market has 
increased, and firms have become more adept at handling acquisitions as well as 
divestment.   
 To analyze the motives of divestitures in the Singapore market, we review a 
sample of Singapore listed companies which underwent restructuring between 1985 
and 1991. Through a case-by-case review of the press announcements and relevant 
supporting information, three broad motivations emerge as the dominant reasons for 
corporate divestments in Singapore:  
 
 
(a) Enhancing Operational efficiency  
A firm that expands rapidly also increases its size and complexity and hence often 
imposes considerable strain on its management and resources. Consequently, 
management loses its focus and efficiency, and company performance may suffer.  
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This argument is related to the economic concept of decreasing returns to scale and 
scope.  There is an optimal operational size for a company.  
 
Operational efficiency is evidently the motivating factor for the divestments of Haw 
Par Brothers and Straits Steamship.  Haw Par Brothers sold its garment and property 
operations to concentrate on its core businesses of leisure, industrials and 
pharmaceuticala.  In the 1991 Annual Report, Haw Par’s Chairman Wee Cho Yaw 
commented that ‘these core business operations make best use of the Group’s 
traditional strength in marketing and distribution, which is also now being augmented 
by related manufacturing activities.  This focus on core business operations enables 
the Group to concentrate its energies and resources more effectively, instead of 
spreading them thin over too many business areas.’   
Similarly, Straits Steamship spun off its shipping subsidiary to focus on 
property development and management.  The company spun off Steamers Maritime, a 
shipping subsidiary, and sold its engineering division.  Subsequently, its name was 
changed to Straits Steamship Land to reflect a more focused identity.b 
 
(b) Maintaining Profitability  
Faced with increased competition, some firms would be under pressure to maintain 
their profitability. One way is to increase operational efficiency through 
specialization and concentration of resources. Another way is to boost earnings by 
harvesting profitable assets and disposing unprofitable ones.  
                                                 
a See The Straits Times and Business Times on 31 January 1989 and 18 January 1991, and 
Haw Par Brothers 1991 Annual Report.  
b See The Straits Times and Business Times on 9 February 1989. 
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An example of a corporate divestment that improves profitability is the sale of 
a shopping complex, the Paragon, by United Industrial Corporation (UIC), for S$690 
million, which yielded a profit of S$292 million.c An illustrative example of 
removing an unprofitable asset is the sale of a Malaysian subsidiary, Cold Storage 
Malaysia, by Cold Storage Holdings, to Cycle and Carriage in 1989.  Cold Storage 
Malaysia had been unprofitable for a number of years.d 
 
(c) Improving Liquidity  
Another problem associated with a company’s rapid expansion is the shortage of cash 
flow. Some companies may then choose to address this problem by corporate 
divestiture. This will then improve corporate liquidity, and may also lower corporate 
debt levels and borrowing costs.  
An illustrative example is the case of UIC.e After its billion dollar takeover of 
Singapore Land, the company was over-leveraged and cash-strapped. When its 
attempt to raise additional financing from the capital market was unsuccessful (its 
rights issue was rejected by the Stock Exchange of Singapore), UIC disposed several 
assets such as properties, hotels and equity shares to improve its financial position.   
The divestitures included the sale of its interests in Inchcape House, Supreme House, 
Phuket Yacht Club, Tung Centre, First Capital Corporation, Development and 
Commercial Bank and Toyo Bank.  Finally, UIC had to trim its holdings in Singapore 
Land at a loss of S$138.2 million to maintain its borrowings at a sustainable level. 
                                                 
c See The Straits Times and Business Times on 21 September 1989 
d See The Straits Times and Business Times on 28 July 1989 
e See The Straits Times and Business Times on 28 May 1990, 6 June 1990, 16 July 1990, 17 
June 1991 and 13 September 1991 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
To examine the announcement effects of corporate divestitures on share prices 
in Singapore, we formulate the following three working hypotheses. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Announcements of corporate divestiture do not yield abnormal 
returns in share price. 
 
Hypothesis 1 examines the overall price effects of divestiture announcements 
in Singapore. Rejection of this hypothesis indicates that divestiture announcements 
have an impact on shareholder wealth. A significant positive change in share prices 
implies that corporate divestitures are generally viewed as beneficial to a company. 
Ceteris paribus, a decline in share prices indicates otherwise.  If the hypothesis is not 
rejected, it means that corporate divestments of most local firms do not affect their 
market worth.  Past studies by Hite and Owers (1983), Rosenfeld (1984), and 
Schipper and Smith (1986) provide empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Announcements of large corporate divestiture do not yield a 
significantly larger rate of abnormal return than the announcements of small 
corporate divestitures.  
 
Hypothesis 2 compares the announcement effects of large and small 
divestitures in Singapore. Studies by Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld 
(1983) show that large divestitures in the United States have a significantly stronger 
announcement effect than small divestitures. Their findings further strengthen the 
argument that divestitures are generally advantageous to shareholders. For the 
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purpose of testing this hypothesis, a large divestiture is defined as one where the 
divested assets form 10 per cent or more of the divesting firm’s market capitalization.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Announcements of corporate divestitures with large relative 
accounting gains do not have a significant larger rate of abnormal return than those 
with small relative accounting gains.  
 
Hypothesis 3 investigates the relationship between share price movements and 
the relative size of accounting gains arising from the divestitures. The efficient 
markets hypothesis postulates that the current value of a firm should be fully reflected 
in its share price. An accounting gain is the difference between the selling price and 
book value of a divestiture. If selling price of a company’s assets is correctly priced, 
the event will not result in abnormal gains, ceteris paribus. For the purpose of testing 
this hypothesis, a divestiture with large accounting gain refers to one where the gain 
is more than 5 per cent of the divesting firm’s market capitalization.  
 
5. Data, Sample and Methodology 
The sample used in this study comprises all form of divestitures (spin-offs, 
sell-offs, and equity carved-outs and partial private sale) undertaken by companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) between July 1985 and April 1991. 
This sample consists entirely of Singapore incorporated companies. The original 
sample consists of 105 events, but is later reduced to 63, due to data incompleteness 
as well as the removal of clustered events in order to avoid confounding effects. Also, 
in our study, involuntary divestitures, such as the compulsory sell-offs due to 
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statutory acquisitions by the government are excluded.  (The list of divestitures is 
available from the authors.) 
The Mean Adjusted Return (MAR) model is used to compute abnormal 
returns in share prices, for the purpose of examining the announcement effects of 
divestitures. This model assumes that the expected return for a security is constant, 
but may differ across firms. It is selected for its simplicity and relative accuracy. 
Evidence by Brown and Warner (1980) suggests that in the absence of event 
clustering, the MAR model performs as well as other sophisticated market models in 
detecting abnormal performance. This approach has been used by Masulis (1980), 
Dann (1981), Rosenfeld (1984) and Alexander et al. (1980) in their studies.  
The event period employed in this study is 211 days, consisting of 180 days 
before and 30 days after day 0, which is the first available press announcement date 
of the divestiture.  The estimation period is from day – 180 to day – 31, while the test 
period extends from day –30 to day +30.  
For each stock, the mean return is computed by taking the arithmetic mean of 
the series of daily returns over the estimation period. This mean return is then 
subtracted from the daily returns over the test period to give a series of residuals.  
For each day of the test period, we compute an average residual (AR) which is 
the average of the residuals on that day for all the stocks in the sample. The 
cumulative average residual on day t (CARt) is found by summing the average 
residuals from day -30 to day t.  
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1      Announcement Effects of Divestitures 
The summary of abnormal returns and their respective t statistics are 
presented in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 1.  
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
The results show that corporate divestitures, on average, yield significantly 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates. The strong positive 
abnormal gains detected on and after the announcement dates suggest favorable 
market reaction towards the divestitures. The abnormal return on the announcement 
date is statistically significant at the 1% level.    To examine the robustness of the 
results, the data is also tested using the market model. As the results obtained are 
similar to those for the mean adjusted models they are not presented here. 
The fact that day 0 has the largest AAR (average abnormal return) of +2.43% 
is not surprising. The strong result for day 0 is due to the immediate market reaction 
towards the divestment. A weaker but significant AAR is also recorded for day +1, 
after which, the AARs appear to fluctuate randomly, indicating no further impact of 
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the information. Thus, news of divestment is quickly impounded in the stock prices 
within a relatively short period. 
Significant market movements recorded before the press date (day –3 and day 
–2) indicated that information pertaining to the divestitures may have leaked into the 
market before the actual announcement. Market speculation could have increased 
trading volumes and driven up share prices.  
Interestingly, the average residual for day -1 is small and statistically not 
significant. This could be partly explained by the suspension of trading for some 
companies until the announcement of the divestitures.  
Hence, the results show that the divestiture announcements are generally 
beneficial to shareholders. These findings reject the hypothesis that there are no 
abnormal returns associated with the announcement of divestitures. The results are 
also consistent with those found by Hite and Owers (1983), Rosenfeld (1984) and 
Schipper and Smith (1986).  
 
6.2  Announcement Effects of Large versus Small Divestitures 
In this test, the sample of 63 observations is divided into two sub-samples 
using the classification stated above. The large divestitures sub-sample consists of 28 
events, while the small divestitures sub-sample consists of 33. 
The results, which are presented in Table 3, show that large divestitures yield 
a comparatively higher abnormal return than small divestitures. The average residual 
for large divestitures on day 0 is 3.85% and is statistically significant. This compares 
with a much lower average residual of 1.29% for small divestitures on that day.  
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--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, the findings reject the hypothesis that announcements effects for both 
the large and small divestitures are the same. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Miles and Rosenfeld (1983). 
 
6.3 Announcement Effects of Large versus Small Accounting Gains 
The previous section shows that large divestitures generally yield a higher rate 
of abnormal return than small divestitures. From the sub-sample of large divestitures, 
data for 22 companies that report accounting gains are available. Of these, 12 
companies exhibit large accounting gains, while the remaining 10 companies make 
small accounting gains. The results of the t-tests are presented in Table 4. 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
The findings indicate that the sub-sample with large accounting gains yield a 
significantly larger abnormal return than the sub-sample with small accounting gains. 
The companies with large accounting gains sub-sample registered highly significant 
average residuals on day -2 and day 0, indicating favorable market reaction towards 
the announcement of large accounting gains. In contrast, the companies with small 
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accounting gains sub-sample fail to register any significant price movements 
throughout the 61-day observation period.  
The fact that significant differences in abnormal returns appear strongly on 
day 0 through day +1 interval, and not during other intervals, suggest a direct 
relationship between share price movements and the relative size of the accounting 
gains due to the event. Since large accounting gains generate greater abnormal returns 
than small accounting gains, the findings reject the hypothesis that there are no 
significant differences in the announcement effects of corporate divestitures with 
large and small accounting gains.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This objective of this study is twofold.  Firstly, we seek to understand the 
motivations surrounding corporate divestitures in Singapore.  Next, we use a sample 
of Singapore divestitures to examine the price effects around the period of 
announcements, to determine if such announcements have measurable impacts on 
share price performance.  Using the Mean Adjusted Return model, we find that 
divestiture announcements are generally accompanied by positive abnormal returns. 
Further, there exists a strong relationship between share price movements and the 
relative divestiture size and accounting gains.  
The market’s positive reaction towards divestitures indicates that such actions 
are generally viewed as beneficial to the divesting company’s shareholders. The 
likely sources of gain stem from the observed motives of divestiture, which are 
principally to achieve: (a) operational efficiency (b) higher profitability and (c) 
improved financial liquidity.  
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The positive relationship between share price movement and the relative size 
of divestiture that we found is also not surprising. Considering the fact that 
divestitures are generally beneficial, larger divestitures are likely to contribute 
proportionately more to shareholder wealth than small divestitures.  
The findings that share prices are affected by accounting gains suggest that the 
Singapore market is rational and anticipates the accounting gains. Overall, these 
results are consistent with those of earlier studies in the United States.   
In recent years, to comply with the Monetary Authority of Singapore's (MAS) 
requirement that local banks cut their holdings in their non-financial assets to 10%, 
Singapore banks have been divesting their non-core assets.  This process is still 
ongoing and will provide additional data for future research.  Further work is also 
being carried out by the authors to extend this study to include the recent corporate 
restructuring activities in the Southeast Asian region.     
 
 19
REFERENCES 
Alexander, G.J., P.G. Benson and J.M. Kampmeyer, 1980, Investigating the 
Valuation Effects of Announcements of Voluntary Sell-Offs, Journal of 
Finance, 39, 503-517 
Berger, P. and E. Ofek, 1995, Diversification’s effect on firm value.  Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 39-65. 
Brown, S.J. and J.B. Warner, 1980, Measuring security Price Performance, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8, 205-258. 
Comment, R., and G. Jarrell, 1995.  Corporate focus and stock returns.  Journal of 
Financial Economics, 37, 67-87. 
Cusatis, P.J., J. A. Miles and J.R. Woolridge, 1993, Restructuring through Spinoffs: 
The Stock Market Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 293-311. 
Daley, L., V. Mehrotra, and R. Sivakumar, 1997.  Corporate focus and value creation: 
Evidence from spin-offs.  Journal of Financial Economics, 45, 257-281. 
Dann, L., 1981, Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders 
and Stockholders, Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 113-138. 
Gilson, Stuart C., 2001, Creating Value through Corporate Restructuring, John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Habib, M.A., D.B. Johnsen and N.Y. Naik, 1997, Spinoffs and Information, Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 6, 153-176. 
Haynes, M., Thompson, S., Wright, M., 2000.  The determinants of corporate 
divestment in the UK.  International Journal of Industrial Economics, 18, 1201-
1222. 
Haynes, M., Thompson, S., Wright, M., 2003.  The determinants of corporate 
divestment: Evidence from a panel of UK firms.  Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 52, 147-166. 
Hite, G.L. and J.E. Owers, 1983, Security Price Reactions around Corporate Spin-
Offs Announcements, Journal of Financial Economics, 12, 409-436 
Huson, M.R., MacKinnon, G., 2003.  Corporate spinoffs and information asymmetry 
between investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 481-503. 
Jain, P.C., 1985, The Effect of Voluntary Sell-Off Announcements on Shareholder 
Wealth, Journal of Finance, 40, 209-223. 
Kaplan, S. and M.S. Weisbach, 1992, The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from 
Divestitures, Journal of Finance, 47, 107-138 
Krishnaswami, S., and V. Subramaniam, 1999.  Information asymmetry, valuation, 
and the corporate spin-off decision.  Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 73-
112. 
Masulis, R., 1980, The Effects of Capital Structure on Security Prices, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8, 139-177 
 20
Miles, J.A. and J.D. Rosenfeld, 1983, The Effect of Voluntary Spin-Off 
Announcements on Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Finance, 38, 1597-1606 
Rosenfeld, J.D., 1984, Additional evidence on the Relation between Divestiture 
Announcements and Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Finance, 39, 1437-1447. 
Schipper, K. and A. Smith, 1986, A Comparison of Equity Carved-Outs and 
Seasoned Equity Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructuring, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 152-186. 
Vijh, A.M., 1994, The Spinoff and Merger Ex-Date Effect, Journal of Finance, 49, 
581-609. 
Weston, J. Fred, M. L. Mitchell and J.H. Mulherin, 2004, Takeovers, Restructuring, 
and Corporate Governance, Pearson Prentice-Hall.   
 21
 
TABLE 1 
 
Event Study Analysis of Corporate Divestitures 
 
Research Paper 
Divestiture 
Type Time Period 
Number of 
Observations 
Event 
Window 
Parent 
Return (%) 
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) Spin-off 1963-1980 55 (0, +1) 3.34 
Hite and Owers (1983) Spin-off 1963-1981 123 (-1, 0) 3.30 
Schipper and Smith (1983) Spin-off 1963-1981 93 (-1, 0) 2.84 
Copeland et al (1987) Spin-off 1962-1981 73 (0, +1) 2.49 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) Spin-off 1990-1999 106 (-1, +1) 4.51 
Schipper and Smith (1986) Carve-out 1965-1983 76 (-4, 0) 1.83 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) Carve-out 1990-1999 125 (-1, +1) 2.27 
Klein (1986) Asset sale 1970-1979 202 (-2, 0) 1.12 
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) Asset sale 1984-1989 93 (-1, 0) 1.41 
 
Table 1 is reproduced from Table __ in chapter __ of Weston, Mitchell and Mulherin (2004).  It 
summarizes past empirical findings on the return to parent companies that have experienced spin-offs, 
equity carve-outs and asset sell-offs. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Abnormal Returns of Divestitures around Announcement Date 
 
 
Day AAR t statistic CAAR 
-30  0.0011  0.3172  0.0011 
-25 -0.0010 -0.2813 -0.0021 
-20  0.0019  0.5754 -0.0117 
-15 -0.0004 -0.1088 -0.0149 
-10  0.0003  0.0996 -0.0078 
-9 -0.0057 -1.6838 -0.0135 
-8  0.0039  1.1478 -0.0096 
-7  0.0047  1.3798 -0.0049 
-6 -0.0005 -0.1398 -0.0054 
-5  0.0009  0.2738 -0.0045 
-4 -0.0053 -1.5724 -0.0098 
-3  0.0072 * 2.1383 -0.0026 
-2  0.0094 **2.7856  0.0068 
-1 -0.0012 -0.3485  0.0056 
0  0.0243 **7.1722  0.0299 
1  0.0084 * 2.4832  0.0383 
2 -0.0032 -0.9499  0.0351 
3  0.0027  0.7994  0.0378 
4 -0.0031 -0.9235  0.0347 
5 -0.0019 -0.5641  0.0328 
6  0.0003  0.0780  0.0331 
7 -0.0019 -0.5724  0.0312 
8  0.0003  0.0966  0.0315 
9  0.0031  0.9212  0.0346 
10 -0.0022 -0.6360  0.0324 
15  0.0048  1.4183  0.0258 
20 -0.0016 -0.4828  0.0286 
25  0.0011  0.3347  0.0299 
30 -0.0016 -0.4788  0.0262 
 
*  Significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
**  Significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test 
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TABLE 3 
 
Abnormal Returns of Large and Small Divestitures around Announcement Date 
 
 
 
Large Divestitures Small Divestitures 
Day AAR t statistic CAAR Day AAR t statistic CAAR 
-30 -0.0045 -0.8589 -0.0045 -30 0.0055 1.1421 0.0055 
-25 -0.0025 -0.4842 -0.0115 -25 0.0003 0.0683 0.0058 
-20 -0.0012 -0.2221 -0.0052 -20 0.0045 0.9203 -0.0166 
-15 -0.0003 -0.0611 -0.0038 -15 -0.0004 -0.0779 -0.0234 
-10 0.0042 0.8152 0.0025 -10 -0.0028 -0.2524 -0.0154 
-9 -0.0050 -0.9562 -0.0025 -9 -0.0063 -1.2898 -0.0217 
-8 0.0059 1.1403 0.0034 -8 0.0023 0.4709 -0.0194 
-7 -0.0060 -1.1458 -0.0026 -7 0.0132 * 2.7239 -0.0062 
-6 -0.0003 -0.0600 -0.0029 -6 -0.0006 -0.1179 -0.0068 
-5 0.0025 0.4786 -0.0004 -5 -0.0003 -0.0601 -0.0071 
-4 -0.0073 -1.4126 -0.0077 -4 -0.0037 -0.7582 -0.0108 
-3 0.0025 0.4799 -0.0052 -3 0.0111 * 2.2827 0.0003 
-2 0.0073 1.3988 0.0021 -2 0.0112 * 2.3080 0.0115 
-1 -0.0020 -0.3885 0.0001 -1 -0.0005 -0.0984 0.0110 
0 0.0385 ** 7.4122 0.0386 0 0.0129 * 2.6629 0.0239 
1 0.0134 * 2.5813 0.0520 1 0.0044 0.9134 0.0283 
2 0.0013 0.2417 0.0533 2 -0.0068 -1.3951 0.0215 
3 -0.0005 -0.1020 0.0528 3 0.0053 1.0988 0.0268 
4 -0.0051 -0.9825 0.0477 4 -0.0015 -0.3115 0.0253 
5 -0.0041 -0.7815 0.0436 5 -0.0002 -0.0322 0.0251 
6 -0.0033 -0.6341 0.0403 6 0.0031 0.6486 0.0282 
7 -0.0019 -0.3609 0.0384 7 -0.0020 -0.4035 0.0262 
8 -0.0018 -0.3377 0.0366 8 0.0020 0.4176 0.0282 
9 0.0049 0.9402 0.0415 9 0.0017 0.3578 0.0299 
10 -0.0011 -0.2185 0.0404 10 -0.0029 -0.6056 0.0270 
15 0.0039 0.7509 0.0451 15 0.0056 1.1450 0.0119 
20 -0.0025 -0.4866 0.0441 20 -0.0009 -0.1831 0.0178 
25 -0.0010 -0.1972 0.0327 25 0.0029 0.5964 0.0294 
30 -0.0054 -1.0460 0.0278 30 0.0015 0.3019 0.0269 
 
*  Significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
**  Significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test 
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TABLE 4 
 
Abnormal Returns of Divestitures with Large and Small Accounting Gains around 
Announcement Date 
 
 
 
Large Accounting Gains Small Accounting Gains 
Day AAR t statistic CAAR Day AAR t statistic CAAR 
-30 -0.0069 -0.8488 -0.0069 -30 -0.0044 -0.5201 -0.0044 
-25 -0.0094 -1.1505 -0.0353 -25 -0.0010 -0.1210 0.0021 
-20 -0.0051 -0.6205 -0.0462 -20 -0.0039 -0.4643 0.0180 
-15 -0.0105 -1.2875 -0.0442 -15 0.0050 0.6011 0.0075 
-10 0.0039 0.4772 -0.0633 -10 0.0038 0.4554 0.0387 
-9 -0.0075 -0.9161 -0.0708 -9 -0.0086 -1.0264 0.0301 
-8 0.0031 0.3843 -0.0677 -8 0.0147 1.7545 0.0448 
-7 -0.0057 -0.6939 -0.0734 -7 -0.0069 -0.8274 0.0379 
-6 0.0032 0.3956 -0.0702 -6 -0.0062 -0.7438 0.0317 
-5 0.0019 0.2351 -0.0683 -5 0.0036 0.4346 0.0353 
-4 -0.0034 -0.4215 -0.0717 -4 -0.0119 -1.4196 0.0234 
-3 -0.0101 -1.2417 -0.0818 -3 0.0026 0.3057 0.0260 
-2 0.0180 * 2.2059 -0.0638 -2 -0.0053 -0.6265 0.0207 
-1 -0.0016 -0.1911 -0.0654 -1 0.0005 0.0573 0.0212 
0 0.0660 ** 8.0993 0.0006 0 0.0139 1.6505 0.0351 
1 0.0152 1.8681 0.0158 1 0.0046 0.5493 0.0397 
2 0.0108 1.3238 0.0266 2 -0.0086 -1.0228 0.0311 
3 0.0024 0.2893 0.0290 3 -0.0015 -0.1726 0.0296 
4 -0.0154 -1.8856 0.0136 4 0.0016 0.1934 0.0312 
5 -0.0012 -0.1416 0.0124 5 -0.0039 -0.4659 0.0273 
6 -0.0018 -0.2172 0.0106 6 0.0037 0.4420 0.0310 
7 -0.0064 -0.7881 0.0042 7 0.0055 0.6555 0.0365 
8 -0.0046 -0.5631 -0.0004 8 0.0045 0.5367 0.0410 
9 0.0151 1.8483 0.0147 9 -0.0034 -0.3986 0.0376 
10 -0.0110 -1.3506 0.0037 10 0.0033 0.3963 0.0409 
15 0.0082 1.0115 0.0072 15 0.0021 0.2463 0.0531 
20 -0.0133 -1.6373 -0.0107 20 0.0064 0.7655 0.0707 
25 -0.0030 -0.3626 -0.0247 25 0.0040 0.4728 0.0594 
30 -0.0063 -0.7739 -0.0391 30 -0.0104 -1.2388 0.0498 
 
*  Significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test 
**  Significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) and Average Abnormal Returns 
(AAR) of Corporate Divestitures 
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